Transcendental argument for neutrality: TAN
This was a post I made on Facebook, but figured it would be valuable to share here:
The transcendental argument for neutrality 'TAN'
So I worked up this argument in response to Daniel Akande's most recent video, so I figured i'd post it here to see how other people think of it; I think from this one can develop a kind of 'neutrality presuppositionalism' from it, but I'm still working that out; but here's the argument:
- If it is possible to argue without question begging, then neutrality is possible.
- It is possible to argue without question begging
- Neutrality is possible
- If neutrality is not possible, it is not possible to argue without question begging.
- It is possible to argue without question begging
- Neutrality is possible.
Before going into detail here, I do want to note that when presuppositionalists complain about people 'proclaiming' neutrality but not actually living by what they proclaim, I do not strictly disagree with them i.e. I do not deny that there are hypcoritical advocates for neutrality, those who pretend to be fore neutrality but who are actually just hiding their bias; this is certainly possible, and presuppositionalists can raise real and fair complaints about those who are engaging in such hypocrisy (in one of Bahnsen's lectures he does just that).
Instead, what I disagree with presuppositionalists on is the view that it is impossible to be an authentically advocate for and engage in neutrality; on their view, there is no truly neutral ground, bias is not just difficult to avoid, but impossible; it is well and truly ineliminable, and so no matter how one tries to be unbiased, they will always fail. This is a view I fully and utterly reject; I hold that it is indeed difficult to avoid bias, but I hold the idea that it is outright impossible to be anathema. (note, I hold the 'idea' anathema, not necessarily the people who hold to the idea) but returning to the point:
Potential objections
Objection 1:
The first argument one might make against this is that it begs the question against presuppositionalism, and indeed, against every view which rejects neutrality; for on these views, neutrlaity is impossible and anyone who thinks otherwise is in error, and (if they are on the opposing side of the presupposed view) they are also thereby self-decieved, so that the one holding to this view begs the question.
This is rather obviously false; for to beg the question requires one to insist upon a view when it has yet to be argued for; but then, the transcendental argument does just that; one rather has to object to the premises or the form of the argument, not the conclusion.
Objection 2:
A second objection then would be to accept premise 2 but object to premise 1; one could say that you can engage in indirect arguments of competing worldviews, without ever abandoning one's own view; and so without accepting the possibility of neutrality.
A point of note though is that, in order to do an internal critique of a view, you have to avoid straw manning that view, else you don't critique 'that view' but some other view, and in order to avoid straw manning the view, you have to first examine it to make sure you have an accurate idea of the view; which requires you to temporarily bracket your own view (not reject it, but just momentarily ignore the implications of your own presuppositions) and, for sake of analysis, assume the presuppositions of the alternative view (not in the sense of fully converting to the alternative view; but in the sense of examining it interally, to try to work out it's inner logic).
The issue with all of this though is that this 'just is' neutrality; this is precisely what neutrlaity means i.e. taking a 'neutral' stance to the views one examines, not considering anything about the truth of one's own presuppositions nor the falsehood of other presuppositions; but simply examining the view in as fair and unbiased a manner as one can, so as to give it a fair shake.
A point of note though is that, in order to do an internal critique of a view, you have to avoid straw manning that view, else you don't critique 'that view' but some other view, and in order to avoid straw manning the view, you have to first examine it to make sure you have an accurate idea of the view; which requires you to temporarily bracket your own view (not reject it, but just momentarily ignore the implications of your own presuppositions) and, for sake of analysis, assume the presuppositions of the alternative view (not in the sense of fully converting to the alternative view; but in the sense of examining it interally, to try to work out it's inner logic).
The issue with all of this though is that this 'just is' neutrality; this is precisely what neutrlaity means i.e. taking a 'neutral' stance to the views one examines, not considering anything about the truth of one's own presuppositions nor the falsehood of other presuppositions; but simply examining the view in as fair and unbiased a manner as one can, so as to give it a fair shake.
Thus the only way one can avoid a straw man is via neutrality, and of course, if the only way to avoid question begging is by straw manning someone, then one has not really avoided question begging, for a quesiton is always begged of a specific person as regards their specific view; but if you have to straw man someone, then you're not actually attacking their view; so while you may not be begging the question of the straw man's view, you 'will' still be begging the question of the real person's view.
Objection 3:
Another counter argument would be the one that accepts premise 1 but rejects premise 2.The issue with this though is that, whatever argument one makes, one is just evidently wrong here. Presuppositionalism itself provides a method of non-question begging argumentation, namely internal critique; and people can and have engaged in such critique, which thereby proves that it is in fact possible to avoid question begging. So the rejection of the second premise is just wrongheaded.
Objection 4:
The final counter would take the form of an internal critique of the notion of neutrality, and so argue that neutrality is simply incoherent and should be rejected on that ground.
Thus it may argue that neutrality is self-contradictory on the grounds that you can't be neutral to the idea that you should be neutral about things; that in the very act of engaging in neutrality, one is begging the question of the view that we should not engage in neutrality.
The issue here is that, as demonstrated in the argument against the second counter argument, one cannot avoid question begging and straw manning without being neutral, so that implicitly, this a complaint that one both is and is not begging the question, at the same time and in the same sense; thus this complaint violates the law of non-contradiction, and so is nonsense, and may be dismissed as such.
One could try to push this complaint further, by just dogmatically insisting that it is meaningful without proving it; perhaps on the grounds that assuming that it is meaningless is just an uncharitable interpretation of the argument and proves that one is not really willing to engage with the argument. Indeed, one might note that this is a common characteristic of dogmatic stances, and so just goes to show that insiting upon neutrality makes one unresaonably dogmatic.
The issue here is that whether or not this is a fair counter depends entirely upon whether the one putting it forth is willing to give the same sort of charitable interpretation to the pro-neutrality view; but the issue here though is that, again, as demonstrated in the argument against the second counter; one 'cannot in principle' give a charitable interpretation of a view without first engaging in neutrality in the first place, since that is just part and portion of giving a view a fair shake, which is just to say, part and portion of being charitable in one's interpretation.
So the question arises as to from whom this complaint is coming?
Either the one making this complaint accepts the conclusion of the argument that neutrality is possible, or they do not:
If they do not, then on their own view they cannot be being neutral, and so cannot in principle be engaging in a charitable interpretation, and so their counter-argument here is not justified; for either they are not being charitable themselves, and so have no place in interpreting the pro-neutral group as being uncharitable (for perhaps we are, but they just refuse to see it that way due to their own lack of charity) or else they 'are' being charitible, but since this is impossible on their view, then they engage in a performative inconsistency, proving their own view to be false. In either case, their view is unjustified.
If, on the other hand, they do accept the conclusion, but say, simply object to the argument because they think it's unsound, then it is possible that they are being charitable in their interpretation, but then they also already grant the possibility of neutrality, in which case we have no real debate here.
We may have a debate about the soundness of my argument, but even charitible interpretations can be fallible, so it could be that we're talking past each other, rather than that my view is internally inconsistent, in such a case I'd have to simply engage in a real conversation with the person to try and clarify my terminology to them; I can't really do this with a hypothetical person because I don't presume to know all the ways such misunderstandings might occur; and so can't really presume to be able to exhaustively list them out and answer them, even hypothetically.
Thus, such a thing must wait for a real conversation with a real interlocutor, as may occur in the comments bellow this post. Until such a time, things stand unopposed (for a hypothetical person, not being real, can't actually be interpreting me at all, neither charitably nor uncharitably), and so, as of the time of posting this, I have no reason to believe that my view is internally inconsistent; and every reason to believe it is, and so, I do; and until said conversations, the same would seem also to be the case for all who understand me, an appearance I presently have on reason to doubt, and so, I don't.
Thus it may argue that neutrality is self-contradictory on the grounds that you can't be neutral to the idea that you should be neutral about things; that in the very act of engaging in neutrality, one is begging the question of the view that we should not engage in neutrality.
The issue here is that, as demonstrated in the argument against the second counter argument, one cannot avoid question begging and straw manning without being neutral, so that implicitly, this a complaint that one both is and is not begging the question, at the same time and in the same sense; thus this complaint violates the law of non-contradiction, and so is nonsense, and may be dismissed as such.
One could try to push this complaint further, by just dogmatically insisting that it is meaningful without proving it; perhaps on the grounds that assuming that it is meaningless is just an uncharitable interpretation of the argument and proves that one is not really willing to engage with the argument. Indeed, one might note that this is a common characteristic of dogmatic stances, and so just goes to show that insiting upon neutrality makes one unresaonably dogmatic.
The issue here is that whether or not this is a fair counter depends entirely upon whether the one putting it forth is willing to give the same sort of charitable interpretation to the pro-neutrality view; but the issue here though is that, again, as demonstrated in the argument against the second counter; one 'cannot in principle' give a charitable interpretation of a view without first engaging in neutrality in the first place, since that is just part and portion of giving a view a fair shake, which is just to say, part and portion of being charitable in one's interpretation.
So the question arises as to from whom this complaint is coming?
Either the one making this complaint accepts the conclusion of the argument that neutrality is possible, or they do not:
If they do not, then on their own view they cannot be being neutral, and so cannot in principle be engaging in a charitable interpretation, and so their counter-argument here is not justified; for either they are not being charitable themselves, and so have no place in interpreting the pro-neutral group as being uncharitable (for perhaps we are, but they just refuse to see it that way due to their own lack of charity) or else they 'are' being charitible, but since this is impossible on their view, then they engage in a performative inconsistency, proving their own view to be false. In either case, their view is unjustified.
If, on the other hand, they do accept the conclusion, but say, simply object to the argument because they think it's unsound, then it is possible that they are being charitable in their interpretation, but then they also already grant the possibility of neutrality, in which case we have no real debate here.
We may have a debate about the soundness of my argument, but even charitible interpretations can be fallible, so it could be that we're talking past each other, rather than that my view is internally inconsistent, in such a case I'd have to simply engage in a real conversation with the person to try and clarify my terminology to them; I can't really do this with a hypothetical person because I don't presume to know all the ways such misunderstandings might occur; and so can't really presume to be able to exhaustively list them out and answer them, even hypothetically.
Thus, such a thing must wait for a real conversation with a real interlocutor, as may occur in the comments bellow this post. Until such a time, things stand unopposed (for a hypothetical person, not being real, can't actually be interpreting me at all, neither charitably nor uncharitably), and so, as of the time of posting this, I have no reason to believe that my view is internally inconsistent; and every reason to believe it is, and so, I do; and until said conversations, the same would seem also to be the case for all who understand me, an appearance I presently have on reason to doubt, and so, I don't.
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