An argument against idealism
Premise 2: Mental things exists.
Premise 3: Mental things can be directed to mental things.
Theorem 1: Chains of mental things directed to mental things can exist. (P3, UI, MI)
Theorem 2: If all that exists is mental, all that exists is a chain of mental direction. (1, 3, UI, ACP)
Premise 4: An endless chain of mental direction (be it endless due to looping in on itself or going on infinitely) is meaningless.
Theorem 3: if all that exists is a chain of mental direction, nothing meaningful exists. (P4, UI, ACP)
Theorem 4: If all that exists is mental, nothing meaningful exists. (T2, T3, CP)
Premise 4: Something meaningful exists.
Conclusion: Not everything is mental. (T4, P4, MT)
Defense of premises and theorems:
Defense of premise 1:
To be conscious is always to be conscious 'of' something, so awareness is awareness of something, experience experience of something; thought is always thought about something, conception or idea always an idea or concept of or about something, etc. there is always an 'of-ness' or 'about-ness' in mind, so that the identity of the mental involves this directedness.
Note on defense of premise 1: This directedness is sometimes called 'intentionality'. However, the term 'intentionality' is sometimes used for a more specific kind of directedness, one which is more self-aware, conscious, and reflective; whereas the directedness I am speaking of exists even in pre-reflective, pre-conscious mental phenomena not involving self-awareness i.e. it would exist even in the panexperientialist view of reality, where all matter involves some kind of awareness, even if not conscious awareness (like unconscious or subconscious awareness), and it would also apply to ideas of so called 'non-intentional awareness' for it shall still be 'awareness of something' and so, involve a sort of directedness.
Defense of premise 2:
This is evident from introspection.
Defense of premise 3:
This is evident from reflection upon introspection; for in introspection I can think about thinking, I can be aware of being awareness, I can, indeed, reflect upon reflection as such; indeed, the very idea of 'reflection upon introspection' is itself a case of mental things (reflection) being directed to yet other mental things (introspection) thus mental things can be directed to mental things, both themselves and others.
Defense of Theorem 1: From premise 2 and 3:
This follows from universal instantiation and mathematical induction. For If I can think about thinking, so if I was thinking about experience, I can 'think about thinking about experience' which is a higher order level of thinking, but also therefore a chain; and again; I can be aware of being aware that I am thinking about thinking about experience, etc. such chains can be trivially multiplied ad infinitum; so that the first member of the chain is implicitly directed to the same thing as the last member, by means of all the other members.
Defense of Theorem 2: From premise 1 and 3: this simply flows from universal instantiation and assumed conditional proof; for supposing all is mental, then since all mental things are directed, then all that exists is directed, but since there is nothing non-mental to be directed to, only mental things, then all that is directed, is directed to mental things, and so, to other directed things; so that all that exists shall be a great chain of mental direction.
Defense of premise 4: this comes from the nature of this directedness. Since mental things get their identity from being directed at something, then the identity of the mental entity is incomplete if there is nothing that it refers to; but in an a chain of such things, the identity of the each member in the chain except the last member is deferred, since it's identity as the sort of mental thing it is includes all it is directed to, and all that it is directed to shall not be set until we get to the last member of the chain, so it's identity will not be set until we get to that last member, so that it does not meet the law of identity (it is not the same as itself, due not having a 'self' to be the same as) unless it has a last member, so as to complete it's identity. However, in an endless loop, there is no last member, and so, no complete identity. Since a violation of a law of thought, such as identity, results in meaninglessness, so likewise shall talk of such an entity be meaningless.
Defense of theorem 3: from premise 4.
This again follows from universal instantiation and assumed conditional proof; for supposing all that existed were an endless chain of direction, then nothing would have a complete identity, and so the law of identity would always be violated; nothing would be the same as itself, because nothing would have a 'self' to be the same as. Since the laws of thought govern meaningfulness, then nothing meaningful would exist on this supposition, proving the case.
Defense of theorem 4: from theorems 2 and 3. This follows from conditional proof.
Defense of Premise 4: This is self-evident i.e. it is true in virtue of its own meaning. If nothing meaningful existed, then those words would not be meaningful, and so could not well and truly be objected to in the first place; The only proper response would be to question the meaningfulness of the statement, but of course, you could not question it's meaningfulness unless (i) meaning was something you were open to the possibility of finding, and more basically (ii) unless 'the question itself' was meaningful, so that in such a case, one's very act of questioning it proves the case. Indeed, to deny that anything meaningful exists is a performative contradiction; for to deny a proposition requires the proposition to exist, so as to be denied, and a proposition 'just is' the meaning of a statement's s a concept or idea 'just is' the meaning of the terms. Thus, there is no logically possible world in which someone both denies meaning, and meaning does not exist.
More to this, this is true not just of meaning in the sense of the signifying function of natural language, but also meaning in the sense of existential meaning; for existential meaning (the 'meaning' sought after in questions like 'what is the meaning of life?') is itself rooted in and flowing from signifying meaning; for existential meaning has to do with the choices we make (for the existential deals with 'the meaning of life' not just in general, but also 'the life that we live' and of course, to 'choose' to live a certain way just is to live a certain way.) but to make a choice requires you to, well, direct your will to one option over another, but to direct your will to an option, you must first have the concept or idea of the option in mind, so as to direct the will through the idea or concept of the option, to the take the option, and so lead the body to perform the action defined by the option. (Be that bodily action simply sitting still as one reflects upon one's options and/or forms one's plan to attain a given option, or be it the actual carrying out of said plan (or, if done on the fly, improvisation) that the will directs itself towards) the point, in either case, is that the abstract idea or concept of the option has to be in mind first, before the option can be entered into concrete existence by the will's act of will. Since, however, the human mind holds it's ideas and concepts through concrete signs and symbols in language, then it is required that meaningful language exist in order for all this to occur; and indeed, all of this occurs precisely 'through' meaningful language, or (in the case of more quick actions) through intuitions and memories born from such language; which one acts upon quickly in response to circumstances as they emerge.
Thus even existential meaning, which is worked out through our choices of how to live, which we clearly have through our choices (for anyone who has ever had any degree of fulfillment, be it through family, friends, country, career, hobbies, charity, religion, or what have you, knows from experience that some degree of existential meaning exists; precisely insofar as for them, the question 'what is the meaning of life' is reduced to something more of an academic question, than something existential, precisely through their life choices fulfilling them so much that it does not take on said existential dimension, one only truly desire the answer to questions about existential meaning when one is deprived of said meaning, in all other cases the question shall only be asked for at best academic purposes, but with no real sense of urgency) thus the truly academic question to the existence of meaning is answered through the academic reality of meaningful words, and the analysis of it's relationship to the every day reality of the lives of those who are not miserable in life, but who have some degree of contentment on account of the various sources of their meaning; such existential meaning is made possible through linguistic meaning, and made actual through the union of the will to choose and the circumstances which make such choice possible.
Defense of conclusion: it follows Theorem 4, Premise 4, modus tollens.
Comments
Post a Comment